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ABSTRACT
While previous time series studies have quite consistently found that
the minimum wage reduces teenage employment, the extent of this reduction
is much less certain. Moreover, because few previous studiesreport results
of more than one specification, the causes of differences in estimated
impacts are not well understood. Less consensus is evident on the effect
of the minimum wage on teenage unemployment, or its relativeimpact on
black and white teenagers.
The purpose of this paper is both to update earlier work andto analyze
the sensitivity of estimated minimum wage effects to alternativespecifi-
cation choices. In addition to providing estimates of the effect ofminimum
wage increases on aggregate employment and unemployment rates of teenagers,
we explore several related issues: the relative importance ofchanging
the level and coverage of the minimumwage; the timing of responses to a
change in the minimum; effects on part—time and full—time work; effects
on young adults (age 20—24).
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(301) 454—4182 (202)274—8104 (703) 433—6605In the last ten years, roughly twenty time-series studies of theeffects of
minimum wages on the employment and unemployment ofteenagers (16- to 19-year-
olds) have appeared. For teenagers as a group, most studies found thata 10 per-
cent increase in the minimum wage would reduce teenage employmentby one to
three percent. The range of estimates of the effect of such an increaseon the
unemployment rate was considerably wider --fromessentially zero to over three
percent (Brown, Gilroy and Kohen, 1981). Our survey revealed no support for the
popular view that black teenagers suffer larger employment losses than their
white counterparts, although there is some evidence that unemployment effects
of the minimum wage are larger for blacks than for whites. The few studies which
focused on 20-24 year olds found that the minimum wage reduced employment and
increased unemployment for this group, but by lesser amounts than for teenagers.
In most of the research, the period studied ended in the late 1960s or
early 1970s, so that the more recent experience (the 1974 and 1977 Amendments to
the Fair Labor Standards Act) was not included. As one might expect, the studies
differ in their choice of functional forms, lag structures, and independent
variables. Surprisingly, however, there is very little discussion of how these
differences affect the estimated minimum wage effects.
The purpose of this paper is to update existing estimates of the effects of
minimum wages on employment and unemployment rates of youth, and tocompare the
results of different specifications. Section I briefly describes the theoretical
framework in which the minimum wage has been analyzed. Section II discusses an
operational model for the estimation of employment and unemployment effects of
changes in the minimum wage and presents a summary of estimates of the major
studies, while Section III describes the data sources and estimation procedures
together with the results of our empirical analysis. Section IV provides some-2—
empirical extensions to the basic analysis. Section Vsummarizes the major find-
ings and provides concluding remarks.
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The conventional neoclassical theory posits a decline in thelevel of em-
ployment in response to an increase in (orintroduction of) a statutory minimum
wage. At the above-equilibrium wage, employersrespond to the higher cost of
labor by using less of it, and an excess supply of labor forms asfewer jos are
rationed among more workers. Of course, the basis of comparisonis what would
otherwise have occurred; in a situation where employment was expanding,the
minimum wage would simply limit the increase in employment.
Two alternatives to this conventional competitive model are possible:the
familiar textbook example of a monopsonist who may actuallyhire more labor in
response to a skillfully set minimum (Stigler,1946), and the case of an em-
ployer who is "shocked" into increasing productivitywhen faced with a higher
wage bill as a result of the minimumwage.' The validity of these models is dif-
ficult to assess directly however. To the extent thattheir predictions of the
employment effect differ from that of the standardmodel, they can be tested
with the same estimating equations. That is, only theresearcher's prior expec-
tation about the direction of the employment effect woulddiffer.2
Recent theoretical work on the employment effectsassociated with the
minimum wage has centered on two basic extensions of thestandard competitive
model: (1) the explicit inclusion of both the covered anduncovered sectors,
and (2) a more careful treatment of the effects of theminimum wage on measured
unemployment.
Recognizing the existence of two types of jobs
--thosewhich are covered
by the provisions of the Fair Labor StandardsAct (FLSA) and those which are-3-
not --amandated minimum wage increase would beexpected to reduce employment in
the covered sector. Workers whoare unable to find jobs in this sectorare faced
with several alternatives: (1)accept employment in the uncovered sector,perhaps
while searching for coveredemployment; (2) remain unemployed with the hope of
obtaining a job in the covered sector; or (3) withdrawfrom the labor force. To
the extent that the first alternative ischosen, the wage in the uncovered sector
would fall, and the resultant employment increase
would help mitigate the employ-
ment loss in the covered sector. There is
a possibility, too, that wages in the
uncovered sector may actually rise, if workers inthe uncovered sector choose to
search for jobs in the covered sector at thehigher FLSA-determined wage.
The net result dependsupon the elasticities of demand for labor in the
covered and uncovered sectors, the rate ofwithdrawal from the labor force, and
the extent to which displaced workers in thecovered sector remain unemployed
in hopes of finding work there. The relativemagnitudes of these several factors
clearly is an empirical matter, and the net outcome oftheir interaction cannot
be predicted by theory alone.
The second refinement of the basic model isa movement away from the view
that workers displaced by the imposition ofa (higher) minimum wage, together
with those who may be attracted to the labormarket to search for work at the
higher wage, comprise the pool of unemployed. Becausesome of these persons be-
come discouraged with job prospects and leave the laborforce, they are excluded
from the official unemployment count. Mincer(1976) has formally modelled this
latter choice, assuming that those whoare officially unemployed regard the
ability of finding a covered job as more attractivethan either uncovered sector
employment or nonmarket alternatives. In this model, thepossibility of searching
for covered-sector work whileremaining employed in an uncovered job is not con-
sidered.-4-
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Time-series studies which attempt to estimate the effect ofminimum wages
on the labor force status of youth have relied upon singleequation models of
the type
Y f (MW, D, X1. .•Xn)
where the dependent variable Y is a measure of labor forcestatus. Independent
variables include MW as a measure of the minimum wage, D as abusiness cycle
variable, and X1... X, which represent a host of other presumably exogenousex-
planatory factors.
To measure the "employment effect" of the minimum wage,the ratio of em-
ployment to population is used most often asthe dependent variable. "Unemploy-
ment effects" are usually measured as the effect ofthe minimum wage on the
proportion of the labor force (or of the population)unemployed. Unemployment
equations were characteristic of the earlier studies;the more recent research
has estimated the effects of the minimum wage on theemployment-population and
labor force-population ratios, and has derived the unemploymenteffects from
these.
The key variable, minimum wage, has generally beenmeasured by the ratio of
the nominal legal minimum wage to average hourly earningsweighted by coverage,
as devised by Kaitz (1970). Ratios ofminimum wage rates to average hourly earn-
ings were calculated for each industry, weighted bythe proportion of workers
covered. These were combined into an index in whichthe weight for each industry
ratio is the number of persons employed in the industry as aproportion of total







MW = basicminimum wage rate
AHE = averagehourly earnings of nonsupervisory workers
C =proportionof nonsupervisory workers covered by the basic
minimum wage rate
MW* = minimumwage rate for newly covered workers
C =proportionof nonsupervisory employees covered by the mini-
mum wage applicable to newly covered workers
i =majorindustry division
t =totalprivate nonagricultural economy
Most studies which use this index use teenage employment ratios as weights.
This formulation allows the index to reflect changes in coverage as well as
in the level of the minimum wage, and further, embodies the idea that the impact
of a given minimum would be greater the higher is that minimum relative to
market-determined wages. Most studies have incorporated Kaitz's measure or some
variant of it in their regression equations, combining thecoverage and level
of the minimum in a single variable.
All studies incorporate a business cycle variable as a measure of the over-
all demand for labor, for which many proxies have been used. Additional vari-
ables often included are those to control for youth's participation in the armed
forces and in employment and training programs, school enrollment, and potential
labor supply. Most studies have included a time trend variable as well.
The findings of those studies which attempt to measure the employment/un-
employment effects of a minimum wage onteenagers(16-19 years) are reported
in Table 1. In order to enhance the comparability of these studies, their re—
suits are displayed in terms of elasticities for employment and percentage point-6-
increases for the unemployment rate.3
To further enhance comparability of results, several types of aggregation4
were necessary: (1) combining separate estimates for 16-17 and 18-19 year olds
when estimates for the 16-19 group were not presented; (2) for different race-
sex groups when results for teenagers as a whole were not reported; and (3) sep-
arate estimates for enrolled and non-enrolled individuals.5
The unemployment effects in Table 1 represent the change in the unemploy-
ment rate due to a 10 percent change in the minimum wage. For example, an entry
of 0.50 would indicate that a minimum wage increase of 10 percent is estimated
to raise the unemployment rate from, say, 6.0 to 6.5 percent. Just as the em-
ployment elasticities were aggregated as described above, so the labor force
elasticities were similarly weighted using labor force shares.
On balance, the effects of a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage are
estimated to result in about a 1-3 percent reduction in total teenage employ-
ment (Table 1). All studies find a negative employment effect for all teenagers
together. Since it was necessary to compute many of the overall effects" from
the disaggregated age-sex-race equations, it is not possible to conduct tests
to determine whether they are statistically significant. The coefficients from
these disaggregated equations were mostly negative, with about half being sta-
tistically significant.
Although the research is consistent in finding some employment reduction
associated with minimum wage increases, the estimated effects on unemployment
appear to be considerably more varied. Of particular note are thediverse un-
employment effects estimated by Adie (1971) and Moore (1971) on the one hand,
and Lovell (1973) on the other in response to a 10 percent increase in the mini-
mum wage.
Table 1 does demonstrate that there are many different specifications re—- 7-.
presented in these studies. Indeed, the only generalization one can make about
all the studies is that each includes some measure ofchanging economic condi-
tions as a control variable. It is difficult to assess how the differencesin
model specifications affect the results since most authors do notreport how
their findings changed as a result of changes in variables, functionalform,
etc. Lovell (1973) is an exception to this and he found that inclusion ofone
variable (youth's share of population) had importantconsequences for the esti-
mated unemployment effects. Table 1 bears this out. Two of the fourlargest
estimates appear in studies which exclude the population share variable(Adie,
1971 and 1973) while the four smaller estimates are found in studies which in-
clude it (Kaitz, 1970; Lovell, 1972 and 1973; Freeman, 1979).6
The issue of which "control" variables ought to be included in the esti-
mating equations has not been fully resolved. There is general agreement that
other determinants of demand for teenagers should be held constant inestimating
the effect of the minimum wage on employment, labor force participation, and
unemployment. There is less agreement not only on the appropriateness of in-
cluding supply side variables (Adie-Gallaway, 1973; Fisher, 1973; Lovell, 1973;
Goldfarb, 1974), but on precisely which ones and the form they should take if
included (Wachter-Kim, 1979).
The simple supply-demand model described above is sometimes used toargue
for the exclusion of supply-determining variables from both employment andunem-
ployment equations. The model suggests that employment is demand-determined in
the presence of a minimum wage (i.e., how much excess supply ispresent has no
effect on employment), so that supply-side variables do not belong in the esti-
mating equation. Moreover, because supply would equal demand in the absence of
the minimum wage, increases in the supply of teenagers which increaseteenage
unemployment are really "minimum wage" effects as well, and hence are mistakenly-8-
attributed to the supply-side variables if they areincluded in the estimation.
In our view, this position loses much of its persuasivenessonce the overly
restrictive assumptions of the simplest supply-demandmodel are relaxed. For
example, the view that employment of teenagersis demand-determined be cor-
rect for the half of teenagers who earn the minimum wage,but is hard to accept
for the remaining half who earn more than theminimum. Their employment (and
hence the employment of teenagers as a group)must depend on the relative sup-
ply as well as the demand for teenagelabor. (Even if the demand-determination
argument were correct, including truly exogenoussupply-side variables would
not bias the minimum wage coefficient in the employmentequation, though they
might somewhat reduce the precision withwhich it can be estimated. )1
Including supply-determining variables in equationsexplaining teenage un-
employment also seems warranted. Contraryto the apparent message of the sim-
plest supply-demand model, some teenagers
would be unemployed in the absence of
the minimum wage, as is demonstrated by the non-zerounemployment rate of teen-
agers who ordinarily earn morethan the minimum. Hence, the extent of unemploy-
ment not caused by the minimum wage must beheld constant, and including vari-
ables which reflect relative supplies is necessary.This does, perhaps, intro-
duce some ambiguity into estimates of theeffect of the minimum wage on teenage
unemployment --howmuch teenage unemployment would be reducedif the minimum
wage were repealed. However,the relevant policy issue is the effectof marginal
changes in the minimum wage, and holdingthe relative supply of teenagers con-
stant is certainly necessary to make thatevaluation.8
III. RESULTS
Like the studies listed in Table 1, ourbasic sources of data were the pub-
lished and unpublished monthly series from theCurrent Population Survey (CPS).—9—
As did nearly all of those studies,we used quarterly averages of the monthly
observations. The variables we constructedfrom these data were:
EM/P: the ratio of civilian employment to civilianpopulation,9
for teenagers (16 to 19 years ofage)
LF/P: the ratio of civilian labor force to civilianpopulation, for teenagers
UR: the ratio of civilian unemployment to civilianlabor force,
for teenagers
YK: the "Kaitz" index discussed in SectionII, using teenage
employment as weights10
UPR: the ratio of civilian unemployment to civilianlabor force,
for males aged 25-54
AF/P: the ratio of teenagers in the armed forcesto total teenage
population
EN/P: the ratio of teenagers enrolled in school toteenage
civilian population, from the Octobersupplement to the CPS.
The October values were assigned to the fourthquarter of
the survey year and the three followingquarters in the
next calendar year.
TR/P: the ratio of enrollments in federaltraining and employment
programs of those aged 16-21 to civilian population aged 16-
21. The numerator was calculated from (sometimesincomplet
unpublished data for 19 separate programs; considerable
mating was involved. The denominator was approximatedby the
population 16—19 plus two-fifths of the population 20—24.
SY: the fraction of those aged 16-19 whoare 16-17
POP: the ratio of teenage civilian population tototal civilian
population
POPA: the ratio of civilian population 20-24 to totalcivilian
population
PCWEL: price-deflated welfare" (Aid to Families withDependent
Children, Food Stamp, and Commodity Distributionprograms)
benefits per woman of child-bearingage (16-44)
1: a linear time trend
TSQ: I squared
Q2,Q3,Q4: dummy variables for the second, third and fourthquarters-10-
Effects on Teenage Employment
Table 2 presents our estimates of the effects of minimum wages on teenage
employment, using various specifications ofthe estimating equation. The four
columns reflect differences in the functional form ofthe equation --linearor
double-log --andthe estimation procedure --GLS(which takes into account ser-
ial correlation in the disturbance terms) or OLS. Becausethe OLS Durbin—Watson
(DW) statistics consistently showed appreciableserial correlation (a typical DW
statistic being 1.0 or less), the GLS equations should be given greaterweight;
the OLS equations are included in part becausecorrection for serial correla-
tion in the literature is rare.1' The rows of Table 2differ in the control
variables included in addition to the minimum wage indexin explaining the em-
ployment/population ratio.
Line 1 of Table 2 reports estimates from our"basic" equation --onewhich
controls for season of the year, trend (as well as a quadratictime trend),
cyclical factors (measured by the prime-ageadult unemployment rate), and four
supply-side variables (SY, AF/P, TRIP, and POP),in addition to the minimum
wage index YK. The coefficientsfrom these regressions have been converted to
the same measure used in Table 1: the percent changein employment resulting
from a 10 percent change in the minimum wage.
Apart from the "GLS linear" estimates,the versions of the "basic" equation
imply a one percent reduction in teenage employmentas a result of a 10 percent
increase in the minimum wage index. The GLS linearestimate --whichuses the
linear specification often found in the literaturebut which corrects for first-
order serial correlation --isonly about one half as large.
Lines 2-6 report results of individually deletingfive variables which are
often omitted from the studies in Table 1 --thequadratic time-trend term, and
the four supply-side variables. These alterationshave relatively little effect-11-
on the estimates --implyingroughly one percent employment reductions inre-
sponse to a 10 percent increase in the minimum
wage index. Once again the GLS
linear procedure produces
consistently smaller estimates, but theseestimates,
too, are rather insensitive to theinclusion or exclusion of these"marginal"
variables.
Lines 7-9 report the results of
individually adding variables to the esti-
mating equation. In line 7, POPA, the
population share of young adults aged
20-24 is added. One wouldexpect that young adults are relativelysubstitut-
able for teenagers, so thatan increased availability ofyoung adults would
tend to reduce teenage employment.
However, the estimated coefficient of POPA
(not shown in Table 2) was
Consistently and significantly positive. Inany case,
its inclusion raises the estimated
impact of the minimum wage by three to six
tenths of a percentage point.
We also considered the
Possibility that expansions in welfareprograms were
an important determinant of
teenage employment. Presumably, availability ofwel-
fare benefits would act asa deterrent to employment bywelfare-eligible teen-
agers. We measured the impact of welfare
programs (PCWEL) by the price-deflated
value of benefits under the Aidto Families with DependentChildren, Food Stamp,
and Commodity Distributionprograms, per woman in the child-bearingyears. An
important methodological issue is whetherto use a benefits per case (orper
recipient) or a benefits per capitameasure. We opted for the latter, on the
grounds that much of the "welfareexplosion" of the 1960s took the form ofa
greater fraction of eligible familiesreceiving benefits --aphenomenon which
the benefits per capitameasure captures, and the benefitsper case (or per re-
cipient) does not. Indeed, from
1967-73, the price—deflated value of AFDC bene-
fits per case declined. Inany event, increased real welfare benefits wereas-
sociated with eater teenageemployment, a result for which we have noready-12-
explanation. Including the welfare variableraises the estimated effect of the
minimum wage index by 0.6 point in the logarithmic equations,but has almost
no effect in the linear versions.12
Finally, the enrollment/population ratio isadded as a control variable
(line 9). It was not included in theubasicti equation because of some misgivings
about the possibility that it is determined by theminimum wage and/or the teen-
age employment or unemployment rates,and hence is not a pure "exogenous" vari-
able. Its inclusion reduces the estimated minimum wage impactin the OLS equa-
tions, but has little effect in the GLS equations.
The minimum wage index YK used in lines 1-9 canbe thought of as the prod-
uct of the relative level of the minimum wage (comparedwith average hourly
earnings) times the fraction of teenagers who aresubject to minimum wage pro-
visions. (This interpretation neglects the "weighted-average"
nature of the
variable.) While this seems a plausible way of combiningrelative level and
coverage into a single index,it does not permit the estimation of the relative
importance of changes in level and coveragealone, and may combine them incor-
ectly (Fisher, 1973, p. 516; Gramlich, 1976, p.434).
The logarithmic form of the equation is particularlyconvenient for relax-
ing the assumed strictly multiplicativeconstrained relationship between level
and coverage. The logarithm of YK can be decomposedinto the sum of the logar-
ithms of relative level and coverage:
ln(YK) =ln(minimumwage/average hourly earnings) +ln(coverageratio)
Our coverage variable is
YC =(E1/E)(C
+C)-13-
The result of entering ln(YC) in addition to ln(YK) isshown in lines 10
and 11. The effect of the relative minimumwage is then the coefficient of
ln(YK), while the effect of coverage is the coefficient of ln(YK)p]us the co-
efficient of ln(YC). The t-statistic of ln(YC) tests thehypothesis that the
effects of ln(YK) and ln(YC) are equal --i.e.,that the restriction in the
Kaitz index is correct. It can be seen that the estimated effectof the rela-
tive level of the minimum wage is about twice aslarge as in the constrained
version (compare line 10 with line 1, and line 11 with line9). But the effect
of a 10 percent change in coverage is much smaller than in theconstrained ver-
sion (e.g. ,inthe GLS version of line 10, coverage effect =-1.76+1.41=-0.35
compared with the constrained estimate [from line 1] of -0.89).
With the separate coverage variable included thereare two hypotheses which
can be tested: that coverage and level effects are equal, and thatcoverage ef-
fects are zero. Using the t-statistic for ln(YC) to test the firsthypothesis
leads to its rejection (at the .01 level) only for the OLSequation in line 10.
The t-statistic for the hypothesis thatcoverage does not matter (i.e. ,that
the sum of the coeffcients of ln(YK) and ln(YC) are zero)can be calculated
from the variance-covarjance matrix of the estimated coefficients. Eventhe
largest of the calculated t-statistics (1.41, for the OLS equation in line 10)
is to small to reject the "no effect" hypothesis at conventional levels.
These results suggest a disturbing ambiguity in our conclusionsregarding
coverage and relative level effects. Like most other researchers (Moore, 1971;
Lovell, 1973; Gramlich, 1976; Wachter-Kim, 1979; for contrary results, see
Al-Salam, Quester and Welch, 1979), we find relatively weakcoverage effects.
This suggests that the relative level of the minimumwage is more important,
and coverage less important, than intimated by the constrainedequations which
are typically estimated. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that this-14-
result is due to chance alone; indeed we cannot estimate the importanceof
coverage with precision.
13
The equations in Table 2 relate teenage employment to the currentvalue of
the minimum wage index, thus ignoring questions of the timing of responsesto
minimum wage increases. Several of the previous studies adopteddistributed lag
specifications for the minimum wage variable, thus assumingthat the effects
of a minimum wage increase occur gradually over time. AsWelch'4 has observed,
however, the a priori case for a lagged response isdebatable High "normal"
turnover rates among teenagers allow employers to achievedesired reductions
in employment by refrainin9 from hiring new people for a short periodof time.
Moreover, minimum wage increases are ordinarily announcedin advance, so that
responses could as easily precede as follow a newminimum.
Unlike earlier studies, which replaced YK with a distributed lag on YK, we
included a (quadratic, unconstrained) distributed lag inaddition to the cur-
rent-quarter value, using the "basic" specification.With a 4-quarter lag, the
sum of current and lagged effects were similar tothe current-quarter estimates
in Table 2, while an 8-quarter lag reduced this sum to essentially zero.Neither
4- or 8-quarter lags were statistically significant.
We also considered the pre-announcement issue by adding a dummyvariable
for periods when an increase in the minimum wage had beenenacted but had not
yet gone into effect. The YK coefficients werealmost unaffected; the dummy
variable reduced employment by 1 (GLS) to 2 (OLS) percent but wasnot signifi-
cant in the GLS specifications.'8 Adding lagged values ofboth YK and the dummy
did not clarify matters: the results for YK were similar tothose in the pre-
vious paragraph, while the current and lagged effects of the pre-announcement
dummy were larger than in the current-quarter specification.Overall, we regard
the pre-announcement effects as only suggestive; a theoryof how firms should-15-
react to such announcements, and a "variable"which reflects that theory more
carefully than our dummy variable, are clearly needed.
One experiment was conducted which did leadto unambiguous results. As was
true of all studies in Table 1, weneglected the impact of the student certi-
fication program in constructing our Kaitzindex. To test the importance of
this omission, we recomputed the Kaitz indexby treating certified student
employment as subject to a minimum wage of 85percent of the basic minimum.
The recomputed version of YK differed fromthe original version negligibly,
and produced results almost identical (forthe "basic" specification) to those
in Table 2.
LaborForceand Unemployment Rate Effects
Estimates of the effect of a 10 percent increaseon the teenage labor force
(those employed or looking for work) arepresented in Table 3. These are based
on equations identical to those in Table 2,except that the labor force parti-
cipation rate (LF/P) replaces the employment/populationratio (EM/P) as the
dependent variable.
The results of the various specificationscan be summarized quite suc-
cintly. In lines 1-9, where coverage and the level of theminimum are con-
strained to have similar effects, a 10percent increase in the minimum leads
to roughly a one percent reduction in theteenage labor force. In lines 10 and
11, the effects of a 10 percent increase in the level ofthe minimum are some-
what larger (1.5 to 2 percent reduction), whilecoverage has a smaller effect
(0.4 to 0.9 percent decrease). (Recallthat, in lines 10 and II, the "coverage"
effect is the sum of the YK and YC effects.) Wefound to our surprise, that this
withdrawal did not take the form of similar increasesin the official "discour-
aged-worker" count (not shown in Table 3).-16-
If an increase in the minimum wage reduces employmentand the labor force
by the same percentage, as is suggested byTables 2 and 4, then the effect on
unemployment would be zero. While theestimated effects on the teenage unemploy-
ment rate (Table 4) are not exactly zero, they aresmaller than most reported
in Table 1. To interpret Table 4, consider thelast entry in line 1, which cor-
responds to a GLS estimate with a logarithmicestimating equation using the
"basic" set of explanatory variables and the unemploymentrate (or its log-
arithm) as the dependent variable. The 0.05 meansthat a 10 percent increase in
the minimum wage is estimated to increase the teenageunemployment rate by .05
percentage point (e.g., from, say,9.0 to 9.05 percent). Even the largest esti-
mates suggest that a 10 percent increasein the minimum would increase teenage
unemployment by only about one tenth of one percentagepoint. Caution is in
order, however, in interpreting these unemployment
effects. None of them is
estimated with great precision, as reflectedin the low t-statistiCs. Never-
theless, even taking a "high" estimateand going to the upper end of the 95
percent confidence interval, theestimates are still generally less than three-
tenths of a percentage point.
Most, though not all, previous studieshave found appreciable labor force
withdrawal in response to increases in the minimum wage,so that many of those
"disemployed" are not found among the "unemployed."The relative strength of
the labor force withdrawal effect, however,is somewhat surprising, being es-
sentially the same size (in percentage terms) asthe employment effect. It
should be noted, however, that several previousstudies have obtained similar
results (Kaitz, 1970; Lovell, 1972 and 1973;Mattila, 1978; Freeman, 1979), and
that our finding is quite robust in light ofthe specification experiments re-
ported.
We also separated the sample into two subperiods
--1954-69,roughly that-17-
used in the early studies in Table 1, and thereamining 1970-79 period. Results
for the early subperiod lookedvery much like those in Table 2: employment and
labor force effects of about onepercent, and virtually no unemployment effect.
In the later period, employment effectswere somewhat larger (centering on
—1.4 percent), labor force withdrawal smaller(-0.6 percent), and thus unem-
ployment effects which were much larger (0.6percentage points). These results
broadly reinforce our earlier findings, except for thestatistically signifi-
cant unemployment effects in the recent period.
IV. EXTENSIONS OF THE BASIC ANALYSIS
The purpose of this Section is to present additionaltime-series evidence
on the effects of the minimum wage on employment and
unemployment of young per-
sons. Several refinements and extensions of the results in SectionIII are des-
cribed below.
A. Estimated Effects of the Minimum Wage onTeenagers, Race and Sex
Many previous studies attempted to estimate employment andunemployment
effects of the minimum wage on teenagersseparately by race and sex. Indeed,
in many cases the emphasis on thesedisaggregated results was so strong that
no "adding up" of these results was provided to determine theeffect on teen-
agers as a group. For the sake of comparison, this sectionpresents our estimates
of minimum wage effects on teenage labor forcestatus stratified first by race
and then by sex.
Table 5 contains estimates of the effects ofa 10 percent increase in the
minimum wage on the employment of white,nonwhite, male and female teenagers
over the 1954-79 period. The first three lines are estimatesderived from our
"basic" specification. 16-18-
None of these variables is race- or sex-specific, apartfrom the fraction
of teenagers who are 16_17.1 In general, the estimatedeffects for all whites,
all males, and all females are similar to thoseestimated in Section III for
teenagers as a whole --a10 percent increase in the minimum reducing teenage
employment by roughly one percent. Effects fornonwhites are quite different;
the point estimates suggesting that increases in theminimum wage actually in-
crease their employment. However, none ofthe nonwhite effects are estimated
with any precision. Estimates of the magnitude shownhere could occur due to
chance alone if the "true" effect were zero; moreover, wecannot reject the
hypothesis that the white-nonwhite differenceis due to chance alone.18
The third, sixth, and ninth lines of Table 5 presentestimates of the ef-
fect of increases in the minimum wage on aggregate teenageemployment, with
the estimate calculated as a weighted average ofthe disaggregated results.
The results were generally similar to the"directly-estimated" total effects,
presented in Table 2, suggesting no systematicdifference in the two ways of
deriving aggregate estimates.
The effects of a 10 percent increase in theminimum wage on labor force
participation and unemployment are also presentedin Table 5. For whites, males
and females, labor force participation declinesin response to the minimum wage
in about the same proportion that employment declines, sothat unemployment
rates are roughtly unaffected. Labor force participationby nonwhites also de-
clines. Coupled with the estimated increase intheir employment, this implies
a decline in black unemployment in resposeto the minimum wage. The labor force
effects and the GLS estimates of the unemploymentrate effects are not statis-
tically significant, however. This suggests that,once again, the effects on
nonwhites are not estimated with adequate precisionwith these data.
Welch (1976, pp. 121-122) has noted that populationand labor force data- 19-
for nonwhites are subject to considerablesampling error, due to the relatively
small samples of nonwhite teenagers in the CurrentPopulation Survey (CPS).
Since the size of the CPS sample hasgrown over time, weighting the observations
by the estimated number of nonwhite teenagers actuallysurveyed seemed desir-
able. This would place greater weight on themore recent observations, which
are presumably subject to smaller sampling errors. Having donethis, we found
the resulting estimates were only slightly closer to the whiteteenage results.
While it is often asserted that blacks are moreadversely affected than
whites by the minimum wage, previous studies offerquite mixed results on the
issue. We find no support for the assertion, because ofan inability to estimate
accurately the effects on nonwhites. In any case, while we do not claim to have
disproven the view that nonwhites are more adversely affected thanwhites, we
would conclude that such an assertion must rest on theoretical ratherthan
empirical grounds.
B. Effects on Full-time Equivalent Employment
As we have noted elsewhere (Brown, Gilroy and Kohen,1981), most studies of
employment effects of the minimum wage focus on the number of peopleemployed,
neglecting variations in hours worked per week by those who remain employed. The
handful of studies which have examined the hours-of-work issue haveproduced
conflicting results.
One way of addressing the hours-of-work issue is to consider the effect of
the minimum wage on the fraction of those employed who workpart time. An al-
ternative approach, which is pursued here, is to convert part-time workers into
full—time equivalent (FTE) employment. Assuming that theaverage part-time
worker1s workweek is roughly one-half that of theaverage full-time worker,
FTE employment is defined as the number of full-time workersplus one—half that-20-
of part-time workers. We then estimated the effectof the minimum wage on FTE
employment. If the minimum wage increases thefraction of those employed who
are part-time workers, its (negative) effect onFTE employment should be larger
than its effect on number of workers employed.
The findings are summarized in Table 6, which presentsestimates based on
the Ibasicu specification and that specfication withthe enrollment/population
ratio as an added independent variable. Since data onfull-time and part-time
employment of teenagers are available onlysince 1963, the FTE equations must
be based on that shorter sample period. To keepthe comparison between the
standard number employed and FTE employment measures asexact as possible, we
reestimated the previous employment equations based onthe 1963-1979 sample
period. Thus, line 1 of Table 6 reproducesthe results of estimating the 'basic11
equation using the standard measure acrossthe full (1954-79) sample. Line 2
presents the results of estimating the same equationon the shorter (1963-79)
sample, and line 3 presents the estimatedeffect of the minimum wage on FTE
employment over the 1963-79 period. Comparinglines 2 and 3, it is apparent
that the effect of the minimum wage on FTE employmentis somewhat larger than
its effect on the standard employment measure.Lines 4-6 present analogous
results, with the enrollment/population ratioalso held constant. Again,
the effects in line 6 are a bit larger than thosein line 5. Overall, Table 6
suggests that the effect of a 10 percentincrease in the minimum wage is larger
for FTE employment than for employment measured bynumber of workers. The dif-
ference is on the order of 0.4 percentage point, thoughthe precise number is
quite sensitive to the specificationchoice.
More generally, we found that the estimates were quitesensitive to the
choice of independent variables when a linear specificationwas used, but more
robust for the logarithmic form. While precisenumerical values are elusive,-21-
the direction of the results is not: the minimumwage increases the fraction
of employed teenagers who work part time, so that FTEemployment declines more
than number of teenagers employed inresponse to an increase in the minimum
wage.
C. Effects on Employment Status of Young Adults
All of the results presented thus far have been refinementsof an analysis
of the effects of the minimum wage on teenagers. Whileminimum-wage work is
considerably less common among young adults aged 20-24 thanamong teenagers
(about 15 percent of young adults worked at or below the minimumwage in
1980, compared with 45 percent of teenagers), one might still anticipatenon-
trivial effects on this "next-youngest"group.
In order to maximize comparability of results foryoung adults and teen-
agers, the estimated equations for employment/population ratios, labor force/
population ratios, and unemployment rates for young adults were as similaras
possible to the earlier teenage equations. Apart from the obvious differences
(EM/P, LF/P, UR, AF/P, EN/P and POP are based onyoung adult rather than teen-
age values), the only changes in these equations were:
(1) Because TR/P and YK are unavailable foryoung adults, TR/P now refers
to the fraction of all (labor-force age)persons in training pro-
grams, and TK and TC are the minimum wage index and coverage index
using total employment to weight the individual-industry figures;
(2) The variable, SY, which reflected age composition within theteenage
group, is deleted;
C3) In line 6 of Table 7, instead of adding the population share ofyoung
adults, the population share of teenagers (POPT) is added to the
equation (because the population share of young adults is already in-
cluded in the "basic" specification).
Estimates of the effect of a 10 percent increase in the minimumwage index-22-
on young adult employment are presentedin Table 7. The "basic" equations all
yield estimates of approximately 0.25 percentreduction in young-adult employ-
ment (roughly one fourth of the corresponding teenageimpact). The estimates
are generally not "significant" byconventional standards; i.e., such effects
might occur due to chance alone. The remainingestimates in Table 7 center on
the -0.25 estimate, but range from -.10 to-.60. The relatively large standard
errors of the coverage index, TC, inlines 9 and 10 suggest that it is no
easier to disentangle coverage and level effects
for young adults than it was
for teenagers.
Estimated effects of a 10 percent increase on youngadult labor force par-
ticipation are also presented in Table 7.The "basic" equations suggest virtually
no labor force withdrawal among youngadults in response to the minimum wage;
the other equations suggest both increases
and reductions, but these are rarely
more than 0.1 percent in eitherdirection, and are never significant.
Reduced employment and little change in laborforce participation imply
increased unemployment in response to a minimum wageincrease, and that is in-
deed what is displayed in Table 7. The"basic" specification suggests an in-
crease in the young adult unemploymentrate of 0.23 percent point (e.g. ,from
9.0 to 9.23 percent) in response to a 10 percentincrease in the minimum wage.
This estimate is reasonably precise, in that (1)the t-statistics suggest little
likelihood that this result is due to chance alone,and (2) alternative speci-
fications produce fairly similar estimates (withmost in the 0.20 to 0.24
range).
Compared with the results for teenagers as a groupin Section III, the
employment effects are smaller (as wewould expect due to the lower incidence
of minimum wage workers among young adults).We do, however, find unemployment
effects as well for young adults, which wasnot the case for teenagers.-23-
V. CONCLUSION
Previous empirical studies had estimated thata 10 percent increase in the
minimum wage (or in the fraction of workerssubject to it) would reduce teenage
employment by one to three percent. Our own work, whichuses a more up-to-date
and longer sample period than most of thesestudies, suggests that one percent
is a reasonable "single-number" estimate of theemployment effect.
Our estimates clustered in a one half toone and one half percent range.
The lowest numbers were based on GLS estimates anda linear relationship be-
tween teenage employment and the minimumwage index. The apparent sensitivity
of the estimates to the OLS-GLS choice with the linearfunctional form is it-
self interesting; most previous studies report OLSestimates, while, in our
data at least, serial correlation of the residuals isquite evident. The high-
est estimates come from double-logarithmic equations with theyoung adult popu-
lation share or real welfare benefits added asexplanatory variables. However,
both of these variables were "wrong-signed" whenadded, so the revision in
the minimum wage estimate they produce is debatable.
We also experimented with allowing the relative level andcoverage of the
minimum wage to have different effects onteenage employment. Like most previous
studies which made similar attempts, we found "coverage"effects to be rela-
tively weaker than "level" effects. However, thecoverage effects were estimated
with little precision, so the restriction that level andcoverage have equal
effects could not confidently be rejected. None of theprevious studies had
reported attempts to test that restriction.
We also explored the issue of the timing ofresponses to minimum wage
increases. Previous studies had assumed either asame-quarter or a short four—
through eight—quarter lagged response. None of the studies which included
lagged variables discussed the effect of that choice. One mightexpect that-24-
omitting the lagged terms would lead to umissinghi partof the minimum wage ef-
fect. However, no evidence was found to supportthat hypothesis. We did, how-
ever, find some evidence that partof the effect of an increase in the minimum
wage is felt after the changeis legislated but before it goes into effect.
Earlier studies had generally found that teenagers, onbalance, withdrew
from the labor force in response to increasesin the minimum wage. Our results
are consistent with this response. Indeed, wefound sufficient labor force with-
drawal so that employment and labor force werereduced in near-equal propor-
tions; as a result, the unemployment effectsof the minimum wage were estimated
to be practically zero. We find the importanceof labor force withdrawal in our
estimates surprisingly large (given our employment-effect
estimates), but have
no ready explanation for it. Ourestimate compares with a zero to one percent
estimate from most of the more recent studies,and a two to three percent esti-
mate from earlier studies which had not incorporatedthe experience of the
1970s.
We did, however, find significant unemploymenteffects (of about 0.6 per-
centage point) when we considered onlythe most recent (1970-79) period. Since
we had no a priori reason to expectdifferences between the 1970s and the ear-
lier period, we would not emphasize this resultto the exclusion of the full-
sample estimates.
In terms of the several refinements andextensions of the teenage results,
we find little evidence that the effectof the minimum wage on the employment
of white, male or female teens differed appreciablyfrom the one percent esti-
mate. Estimates for nonwhite teenagers are lower(indeed, the estimated effects
were positive), but the standard errorsof these estimates are large. A fair
summary might be that effects seemto differ little by sex, but it is hardto
say anything very definite
about differences by race on the basis ofthe evi-—25-
dence presented. A similar conclusion would apply to estimated unemployment ef-
fects.
We also considered the effect of the minimum wage on full-time equivalent
teenage employment and found that it declines somewhat more than the standard
measure of numbers employed in response to the minimum, suggesting a movement
from full-time toward part-time work in response to an increase in the minimum
wage.
Finally, we examined the effect of a minimum wage increase on young adult
(aged 20-24) labor force status. We found employment effects that tended to be
negative --a0.25 percent reduction in young adult employment in response to a
10 percent increase in the minimum --thoughthese estimates are often not
statistically significant. One would have expected smaller effects for young
adults than for teenagers, if only because fewer young adults are directly
affected by changes in the minimum. We did find statistically significant un-
employment effects (the increase in the minimum wage raising young adult unem-
ployment rates by roughly 0.25 percentage points).
Overall, our results suggest a modest role for the minimum wage in explain-
ing teenage labor market problems. A ten percent increase in the minimum wage
will reduce teenage employment, probably by one percent. It may increase teen-
age unemployment, but certainly not by the two to three percentage points re-
ported in some earlier papers on the subject.-26-
NOTE S
'Surveys of employers find reports of such responsesfrom some (not all) firms,
but there is no evidence on what fraction of increasesin the minimum can be
offset in this way. See U.S. Department of Labor (1959, pp.28, 59, 107, 142,
206, 241-242) and Converse, et al. (1981, pp.269-278).
21n the only published avowed attempt to examine monopsonyand shock effects
empirically, West and McKee (1980) concludedthat neither effect was demon-
strable in the real world, at least in the extantliterature.
To measure employment effects, Table 1 presents the percentchange in employ-
ment due to a 10 percent change in the minimum wage;i.e. ,10times the employ-
ment elasticity of the minimum wage q(E). Forstudies which regressed the
logarithm of an employment measure (theemployment/population ratio [E/P], for
example) on the logarithm of minimum wage (Wm)the coefficient of the minimum
wage variable is simply (E).For studies which use a linear rather than a
double-logarithmic specification, ri(E) equals the regressioncoefficient times
Wm/(E/'P)i where the barindicates the mean value over the sample period.
The unemployment effects are the effect of a 10 percentchange in the mini-
mum wage on the unemployment rate. Forthe studies which estimate separate em-
ployment and labor force equations in logarithmicform using the employment!
population ratio (E!P) and labor force participationrate (LIP) as dependent
variables, the minimum wage coefficients are the employmentand labor force
elasticities q(E) and q(L). Where the equations are linear,the regression co-
efficients must be multiplied byWm/(E!P) and Wm/(L!P)
respectively, to derive
(E) and q(L). The impact (x) of a changein the minimum wage on the unemploy-27-
ment rate can then be derived as follows:
u =1-(E/L)=theunemployment rate
--rE_-_ELL1_E rL E1-rLE1 U[ L2Jt[1j(lu)L-[Ti
x=_____ = (1-u)(q(L) - = theimpact on the unemployment rate m m (in percentage points) of a one
percent change in the minimum wage.
Thus, if the minimum wage increased by 10 percent(IWm/Wm =.10),u ex-
pressed as a decimal is .lOx, and the change in the unemployment rate expressed
as a percent is lOx. For studies in which the dependent variable is the unem-
ployment rate expressed in percentage points, x is calculated as the regression
coefficient for the minimum wage multiplied byWm
4Some studies focused only on certain subsets ofteenagers, and hence could not
be included in Table 1. For a more detailed version of Table 1,see Brown,
Gilroy and Kohen (1981).










6The population share variable in the employment equations received lessatten-
tion, although roughly half of the studies included it. On statistical grounds,
one might expect larger (negative) minimum wage effects if this variable were
omitted from an employment equation. The population share and minimumwage
variables are apparently positively correlated, and the population share tends
(when included) to have a negative effect on employment/population ratios.
7Note that virtually all of the studies in Table 1 estimateemployment equations-28-
whosedependent variable is the employment-to-populationratio. Thus, even
studies which appear not to introduce supply side variablesin the list of in-
dependent variables have effectively includedsuch factors in the dependent
variable. If employment of teenagers is really demand determined,the proper
dependent variable would be employment, not theemployment-to-population ratio.
8The above argument might suggest an interaction of theminimum wage with rela-
tive teenage population in determining teenage unemployment.Given the diffi-
culty in estimating even first-order effects precisely,the interactive approach
has not been pursued. Note, however, that equationswhich use the logarithm of
the unemployment rate as the dependent variable implicitlyimpose a multiplica-
tive interaction between relative supply and theminimum wage.
9Data used in this study refer to the noninstitutional population.
10Data for the minimum wage and coverage components of theindex were obtained
from Minimum Wage and Maximum Hours and the EmploymentStandards Administration,
U.S. Department of Labor. Industry employment and earningsare available from
the BLS 790 survey of establishments published in Employmentand Earnings,
United States, 1909-1978 and Employment and Earnings Supplement.Because estab-
lishment payroll data do not contain information by age,the teenage weights
were derived from CPS estimates.
"Afirst-order serial correlation correction is not exactlyappropriate for the
problem, even if the omitted factors whichdetermine EM/P follow the appropriate
pattern,because the rotation sequence in the Current PopulationSurvey induces
a rather complicated pattern of correlationsbetween the sampling errors. House--29-
holds selected for participation in the Current Population Surveyare interviewed
for four months, dropped from the survey for eight months, and then interviewed
for an additional four months before leaving the sample permanently. Under this
4-8-4 rotation scheme, 75 percent of the sample in a given month is in the next
month's sample, and 50 percent is surveyed in the same month ayear later.
However, given the likelihood that the errors in our estimating equation
are not due to sampling variation alone, the results of the correction for
serial correlation are of interest. Because few of the previous studies have
undertaken any such correction, the probability that their results could be due
to chance alone may have been understated.
'2Betsey and Dunson (1981, Table 4) report broadly similar findings, using AFDC
benefits per recipient to measure the effects of welfareprograms.
13Gramlich has criticized the Kaitz index on different grounds, arguing that
a simple theoretical model implies that the logarithm of employment should be a
linear function of coverage times the logarithm of the relative minimumwage.
Unfortunately, his "relative minimum wage" is the ratio of the minimum wage to
the (unobserved) "equilibrium" wage, so that operationalizing his point is dif-
ficult. Indeed, Gramlich opts for dummy variables to reflectcoverage, and re-
ports little success in identifying coverage effects. While we share the concern
on this issue, we have not been able to develop an alternative minimum wage
"variable" which reflects his point. One version we considered was simply in-
cluding coverage multiplied by the logarithm of the relative minimum wage as an
explanatory variable. However, since the relative minimum is less than one, its
logarithm is negative, so that coverage and level effects are constrained to
have opposite effects.-30-
'41n his comments on an earlier version of this paper, presented atthe American
Economic Association meetings, September 1980.
'5Boschen and Grossman (1981, p. 30) find that next year's minimum wagereduces
teenage employment but next year's minimum wage coverageincreases it. Both ef-
fects are "significant."
'6The equations underlying Table 5 were also estimated withthe (race- or sex-
specific) enrollment/population ratio as an independentvariable, and the re-
sults were very similar to those in Table 5.
'7Race- and sex-specific variables for the armed forces and trainingvariables
were unavailable; replacing the teenage populationshare with a race-specific
share (as was done in several earlier studies) did not appreciablychange the
results.
18The standard error for the difference in minimum wage effects, a,is given by
2 2 2
a =cYW+aN2raWaN
where aW and aN are the standard errors for the whiteand nonwhite effects, and
r the correlation between the errors in thesetwo effects. Moreover, r is ap-
proximately equal to the correlation betweenthe two equations' disturbances.
(This would hold exactly if the independent variablesin the white and nonwhite
equations were identical; only SY differs by race.)The differences between white
and nonwhite effects were not significant in the GLS equations(1.11 (linear)





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































X-1 =minimumwage lagged one period
AL =Almonlag
X+1 =minimumwage in current period togetherwith next year's value
Minimum wage variable
Ml =youthcoverage x minimum wage/average hourly wage
M2 =totalcoverage x minimum wage/average hourly wage
M3 =minimumwage/average hourly wage
M4 =minimumwage/price index
M5 =nominalminimum wage




C3 =prime-agemale unemployment rate
C4 =totalemployment
C5 =realoutput or output index
C6 =moneystock and its growth rate
Youth population share
P1 =teenagepopulation/total (or adult) population
P2 =youth(16-24) population/total population
Armed forces
AF =armedforces/population (teenagers)
A2 =separateequation for armed forces employment
School enrollment
Si =enrollment/population(teenagers)
S2 =separateequation for enrolled, not enrolled
Training and Employment Pograms
Xl =dummyvariables for years with substantial enrollments
X2 =enrollmentin specific programs/population
Time
T =lineartime trend
IT =timeand time squared-33—
TABLE 2
Estimated Effect of a 10 Percent Increase in the MinimumWage







1OLS =ordinaryleast squares; GLS =generalized
tion correction by Cochrane-Orcott method).
21n logarithmic equations, EM/P, UPR, POP, POPA,
logarithmically, other variables linearly.
least squares (serial correla-
PCWEL, YK and YC are entered
3"Basic specification includes Q2, Q3, Q4, TIME, TSQ, UPR,SY, AF/P, TR/P,
POP, and YK as independent variables.
































































































Estimated Effect of a 10 Percent Increase in theMinimum Wage


























































































See Notes to Table 2.-35-
TABLE 4
Estimated Effect of a 10 Percent Increase in the Minimum Wage
on Teenage Unemployment Rates (in percentage points)



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Estimated Effects of a 10 Percent Increase in theMinimum Wage































































'See Note 3, Table 2.
t-statjstics in parentheses-38-
TABLE 7
Generalized Least Squares Estimates of the Effects of a10 Percent Increase in
the Minimum Wage on Young Adult Employment andLabor Force (in percent)





























































































'The basic specification includes seasonal (quarter)dummies, linear and quadratic
time trends, the prime-age male unemployment rate,
the ratio of armed forces to popu-
lation for young adults, the ratio of trainingenrollments (all ages) to population,
the young adult/total population (aged 16and over), and the minimum wage index 1K.
t-statistiCs in parentheses.-39-
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